They also often perceive these rules as bias and in favour of the interest of state. Additional armed group disincentive for complying with law in these situations, is the fact that IHL should not permit these groups “the status of combatant” as it does with the armed forces of state. This implies that armed group members can be punished and prosecuted when they are found to participate in hostile acts under the domestic law, disregard whether their act is complying with IHL or it is not.
Since 2001, 11st September, increasing number of armed groups have been included on the list of terrorists of inter-governmental or state bodies. Therefore, they have now become subjected to wide sanctions.
The criteria, however, for such lists are always not apparent and might, in certain situations, appear to be highly motivated politically rather than depending upon terrorist activity hard evidence. Such a practice can help in presenting extra challenges to encourage IHL compliance by making it problematic for organizations and states to indulge with such groups so as to support compliance.
A number of armed groups, at the same time, have also depicted a will of making explicit commitments for implementing the obligations of IHL, inclusive through declaring unilaterally or conduct code adoption. There are various legal and political reasons behind the decision of armed conflicts that it is in their benefit if they do this. Accepting these commitments, however, does not provide any guarantee that IHL will be respected by them in practical situations.